← All insights

Market Update, February 2018

JCB RETURNS +-0.05% (GROSS) YTD 2018, FOLLOWING ON FROM +4.68% IN CALENDAR 2017, +2.99% IN CALENDAR 2016 AND +4.94% IN 2015.

  • VOLATILITY EXPLODES IN FEBRUARY BANKRUPTING SHORT VOLATILITY FUNDS
  • CREDIT ETF’S HAVE SYSTEMIC WEAKNESS AND CAN BE EASILY TARGETED IN THE RIGHT (ADVERSE) CONDITIONS
  • GLOBAL DATA PEAKING – VELOCITY TURNED NEGATIVE AS HIGHER RATES ARE BITING
  • STOCK BECOMES FLOW – QUANTITATIVE TIGHTENING STILL PRODUCES A MASSIVE BOND BUYER
  • AUD RATES NOW BELOW US TREASURIES ACROSS THE CURVE ON DIFFERING CYCLE AND BUDGETARY OUTLOOKS
Volatility explodes in February bankrupting short volatility funds

The bankrupting of the short volatility fund XIV (Velocity Shares Daily Inverse VIX) in February is a classic market moment and could very well be the Bear Sterns peak behind the curtain before a larger Lehman crescendo. Now released, the volatility genie is unlikely to go back in the bottle as idiotic late cycle fiscal expansion in the US combined with higher global funding rates from the US Federal Reserve will have markets on their toes going forward. The now liquidated XIV product did exactly what it was designed to do, making a small amount of money each day being short volatility until in one single day everything was lost. Any ETF owners (particularly credit ETF’s) should be wriggling in their chairs right now, for the XIV was a complete victim of its own success. Having a public mandate to be one way only in a risky market combined with very large amount of money makes a product highly vulnerable to adverse market movements which force mandated short covering. The volatility community knew full well the thresholds required to trigger a XIV liquidation and surely helped themselves to a grand feast pushing volatility higher and higher until the XIV fund was forced to enter the market and cover risk at one off spike high prices, thereby guaranteeing its own death spiral.

Credit ETF’s have systemic weakness and can be easily targeted in the right (adverse) conditions

Credit markets often re price in an asymmetrical manner, we need look no further than Macquarie’s highly leveraged US infrastructure fund that recently lost around 40% of its value in a day after provisioning for higher funding and debt obligation costs (whilst an equity product the asymmetry is credit (debt) and funding related)  JCB has long argued that higher funding costs will be a huge problem for lower quality assets in a highly leveraged world, as higher funding costs create an income shock in the near term, but also lift refinancing hurdles over time. Warren Buffets famous quote of ‘’we will see who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out’’ is a great illustration for leveraged environment. In adding large US fiscal deficits to a late cycle environment, plus the addition or continuation of higher funding pressure via US rates hikes, the tide is most certainly going out right now for credit. Often at the end of the cycle we get a systemic shock, a company or group of companies that fail unexpectedly from sailing close to the wind. The danger for credit ETF’s comes from the massive credit liquidity gap that now exists between credit debt outstanding (which in the US has roughly doubled since GFC) and primary dealer inventories which have shrunk more than six fold. To put that in context the credit liquidity gap is now twelve times the size it was going into the GFC when credit products froze and where gated for long periods on one twelfth of the liquidity mismatch. The rise of credit ETF’s gives the market a host of products that they can collectively target in adverse circumstances, forcing them to rebalance into weakness (the XIV stop out above will look like a Christmas party) without any circuit breakers seen in equity markets. As funding costs are rising and liquidity is being withdrawn (see also LIBOR rates rising) investors need to think through liquidity sources going forward as the tide goes out, their own liquidity needs through this period and the asymmetry of some current portfolio holdings.

Global data peaking – velocity turned negative as higher rates are biting

Global economic data has been nothing short of great over the back part of 2017 and early 2018, however, the velocity of that data has now turned negative. That is not to say the data will not remain good, but markets price subtle changes quickly and global data has rolled from improving in 2017 to decaying in 2018. Are higher interest rates starting to bite? Almost certainly the selloff in US bond markets is having an impact.  Some isolated global data points of late include; US durable goods orders -3.6%,  US factory orders -1.4%, Germany factory orders -3.9%, global retail sales have been very weak, London house prices dropping at fastest pace since 2009 (Wandsworth/Fulham lost 15%), US mortgage applications -6.6%. Whilst many in markets are still discussing yesterday’s news of a weather effected January US employment report, data has been decaying quickly with a large geographical reach.  JCB retains its view that the US Federal Reserve will likely hike interest rates three times in 2018 (this alone will keep pressure on low quality risk assets via funding costs), however, the extrapolation of the late 2017 environment is short sighted by some market pundits which need to consider the ‘flow’ of markets rather than just focusing on the ‘stock’.

Stock becomes flow – Quantitative Tightening still produces a massive bond buyer

2018 is shaping to be a pivotal year. Political policy is changing, monetary policy is being normalized and asset markets will be asked to stand alone with less Central Bank intervention. Higher volatility is almost certain to remain part of the market construct making investors demand more in return for the higher volatility risk they must endure. Many in markets have discussed the withdrawal of Global Central Bank balance sheet accumulation under the phrase ‘’Quantitative Tightening (QT)’’. This term was first used in early 2016 when the Chinese Central Bank was selling $100 Billion Dollars of US Treasuries a month to stem capital outflow from China.  Many then wrongly assumed yields would rise sharply given the world’s biggest bond buyer (in China) had become a net seller. In fact yields fell and bonds rallied through this period as a ‘’flight to quality’’ bid emerged from the private system as other risk asset markets decayed.  Fast forward to 2018 and QT is again topical, as Central Banks have telegraphed a decline in balance sheet growth. However that isn’t the full story for the bond market, because the existing ‘’stock’’ of previous Quantitative Easing (QE) actually creates new ‘flow’. When bonds on central bank balance sheets mature, their proceeds have to be reinvested just to keep the ‘stock’ of balance sheet from shrinking. In other words, in QE the ‘stock’ generates ‘flow’ itself. And as the stock gets bigger, so do the reinvestment flows: in 2018 total QE reinvestment flows will be some USD $990 billion, vs USD $600 billion in 2016 and 2017. Those reinvestment flows already outstrip balance sheet expansion, with global central bank balance sheet expansion slowing down, reinvestment flows have already become larger than ‘new’ QE flows.

AUD rates now below US Treasuries across the curve on differing cycle and budgetary outlooks

2018 is shaping to be a pivotal year. Political policy is changing, monetary policy is being normalized and asset markets will be asked to stand alone with less Central Bank intervention. Higher volatility is almost certain to remain part of the market construct making investors demand more in return for the higher volatility risk they must endure. Many in markets have discussed the withdrawal of Global Central Bank balance sheet accumulation under the phrase ‘’Quantitative Tightening (QT)’’. This term was first used in early 2016 when the Chinese Central Bank was selling $100 Billion Dollars of US Treasuries a month to stem capital outflow from China.  Many then wrongly assumed yields would rise sharply given the world’s biggest bond buyer (in China) had become a net seller. In fact yields fell and bonds rallied through this period as a ‘’flight to quality’’ bid emerged from the private system as other risk asset markets decayed.  Fast forward to 2018 and QT is again topical, as Central Banks have telegraphed a decline in balance sheet growth. However that isn’t the full story for the bond market, because the existing ‘’stock’’ of previous Quantitative Easing (QE) actually creates new ‘flow’. When bonds on central bank balance sheets mature, their proceeds have to be reinvested just to keep the ‘stock’ of balance sheet from shrinking. In other words, in QE the ‘stock’ generates ‘flow’ itself. And as the stock gets bigger, so do the reinvestment flows: in 2018 total QE reinvestment flows will be some USD $990 billion, vs USD $600 billion in 2016 and 2017. Those reinvestment flows already outstrip balance sheet expansion, with global central bank balance sheet expansion slowing down, reinvestment flows have already become larger than ‘new’ QE flows.

JCB portfolio performance in February

JCB portfolios remained defensive in February, slightly underperforming indexes due to swap spread widening which caused short dated Supra positions to underperform. JCB also missed its key long term buy targets on the intra month spike in yields as we looked to add duration to the portfolio as valuations had improved,  before bond markets recovered and rallied from intra month high yields (lower prices). We did add a small amount of duration which quickly breached our internal expectations, and hence we cut this risk in keeping with our disciplined portfolio management approach and targeted better levels to lift durations. Our lower beta position caused a mild drag versus index into the recovery rally.

This information is for professional and wholesale investors only and has been prepared by JamiesonCooteBonds Pty Ltd ACN 165 890 282 AFSL 459018 (‘JCB’). Channel Investment Management Limited ACN 163 234 240 AFSL 439007 (‘CIML’) is the Responsible Entity and issuer of units for the CC JCB Active Bond Fund ARSN 610 435 302, CC JCB Global Bond Fund ARSN 631 235 553 and the CC JCB Dynamic Alpha Fund ARSN 637 628 918 (collectively ‘the Funds’). Channel Capital Pty Ltd ACN 162 591 568 AR No. 001274413 (‘Channel’) provides investment infrastructure and distribution services for JCB and is the holding company of CIML.

This information is supplied on the following conditions which are expressly accepted and agreed to by each interested party (‘Recipient’). This information contains general financial product advice only and has been prepared without taking into account the objectives, financial situation or needs of any particular person. It is intended solely for wholesale clients (including sophisticated investors) as defined under sections 761G and 761GA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). JCB is not licensed in Australia to provide financial product advice or other financial services to retail investors.

The information provided should not be considered personal advice, a recommendation, or an offer to invest in the Funds. Recipients should not rely on this information in making investment decisions. A Recipient should, before making any investment decisions, consider the appropriateness of the information, and seek professional advice.

Neither JCB, Channel, CIML or their representatives and respective employees or officers (collectively, ‘the Beneficiaries’) make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to accuracy, reliability or completeness of this information or subsequently provided to the Recipient or its advisers by any of the Beneficiaries, including, without limitation, any historical financial information, the estimates and projections and any other financial information derived there from, and nothing contained in this information is, or shall be relied upon, as a promise or representation, whether as to the past or the future. All investments contain risk. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

For further information and before investing, please read the Product Disclosure Statement and Target Market Determination which is available from www.channelcapital.com.au

Perspective, not prediction.

Timely views from the investment team on policy, market structure and portfolio construction.

19 November 2026

The Price of Conviction

Charlie's View

16 October 2026

Higher Yields, Wider Opportunities

Charlie's View

14 September 2026

What If This Isn't a Bond Market Crisis?

A specialist conversation starts here.

To discuss our fixed income strategies, contact our partner Channel Capital.

distribution@channelcapital.com.au
T: +61 3 8580 0088